

Changing Patterns in World Affairs



Secretary Rusk talks with David Schoenbrun of CBS News (at left) on the television program "CBS Reports: An Hour With the Secretary of State."

Announcer: "CBS Reports," which has made an annual tradition of its conversations with former President Eisenhower and Walter Lippmann, presents an hour with the Secretary of State of the United States, Dean Rusk, with CBS Chief Washington Correspondent, David Schoenbrun.¹

SECRETARY RUSK: We call this the Benjamin Franklin Room, after our first great diplomat. He helped design the Great Seal of the United States. One of the duties of the Secretary of State is to be the keeper of the Great Seal. You'll notice that the eagle there, as President Kennedy reminded us in his inaugural address, carries an olive branch in one claw and arrows in the other, and these two—a desire for peace and preparedness for war—are the great preoccupations of our foreign policy.

Here in this state dining room we entertain

chiefs of government and chiefs of state from many countries each year—perhaps 20, 25 in the course of any season, many of them allies, many of them neutrals but from every corner of the earth.

This is the Thomas Jefferson Room, named after our first Secretary of State. Thomas Jefferson was a great man in many respects, but of course we are very proud of the fact that he launched our Government as our—or at least our Department of State—as our first great Secretary.

And this is now the John Quincy Adams Room, who not only was a great Secretary but also a great President, after his service in the Department of State.

The President and the Secretary

Mr. Schoenbrun: Mr. Rusk, do you recall the circumstances of your first meeting with the President, when he discussed the possibility of your getting the appointment?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I had not had the privilege of knowing Senator Kennedy, or President-elect Kennedy, before December 1960. I was in a board meeting of the foundation with which I

¹This television interview, "An Hour With the Secretary of State," was presented by the Columbia Broadcast System on a nationwide hookup on Nov. 28 (press release 700; also available as Department of State publication 7404, which may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price 15 cents).

was working, and he asked me to meet him for a conversation, I think on a Thursday, in the middle of December of that year. Actually, when I had my first talk with him, there was no discussion of my being Secretary of State.

Well, what did you talk about?

Well, I don't know whether I have his permission to say this, but I talked about—we talked about my article in *Foreign Affairs* on the Presidency. Then the next day I had a call asking me if I would take this responsibility. Well, this was, I must say, a bolt of lightning. As a matter of fact, I fully understood for the first time an incident that I think is not—I've never mentioned before. Mr. John Foster Dulles asked me to come up to see him in New York on the day that he learned that he was to be Secretary of State, and he was a very sober and shaken man as he faced that responsibility. I remember at the time I thought that this was rather extraordinary, because here was a man who had been in foreign policy matters all his life—since he was 19 years old, in fact.

Sir, when you speak of sobering thoughts—it must have been a sobering thought for you to reflect upon the fact that 2 years ago you were a scholar and president of the Rockefeller Foundation, engaged in studies, and 2 or 3 weeks ago you looked down the mouth of the cannon at a moment of great decision in the history of our country.

I sometimes wonder whether it is possible for anyone really to be sure that he's qualified to take on such responsibilities. But after all, this is a great country, and the momentum, the strength, the commitments of this country are a decisive element in the present stage of world history. So those of us who are called upon to serve the President can only do our best, in a very complex and dangerous world situation, and see how the story comes out.

Announcer: *The office of Secretary of State has been called the impossible job. For several hours on November the 16th and again on November 24th, the 54th Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, sat in the John Quincy Adams Room and explained the office from Jefferson to Rusk, putting it in perspective some of the momentous decisions of the past 30 days. "CRS Reports" records an hour of that conversation with ...*

Some Illustrious Predecessors

Mr. Schoenbrun: Mr. Secretary, you occupy one of the highest offices in our land and the oldest department of government. You've had some illustrious predecessors. Who among them is your own favorite hero as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I think I would start with Benjamin Franklin, although he was not, strictly speaking, a Secretary of State. He was the head of the first ancestor of the Department of State, the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress, and it was he who carried the main diplomatic burden of the American colonies in their struggle for independence, both here in the United States and in Europe. He gave the lie to the ordinary impression that naive Americans, simple Americans, go to Europe and have their pockets shaken down by the city slickers of European diplomacy.

I would suppose beyond Benjamin Franklin I would turn to Thomas Jefferson, whose picture you see behind me here. He helped launch the country as our first Secretary of State under George Washington—again a man of remarkable talents, who helped to carve out our independence and to shake off the British and Spanish occupations of territories that were considered to be a part of the United States of that day—highly respected by people abroad.

I suppose most historians would refer to John Quincy Adams, whose picture you see here, as one of our great Secretaries of State of the 19th century. That was a period when the rest of the world came to acknowledge that the United States was here to stay. I would suppose that he would clearly rank as one of our great Secretaries of State.

But I think I would be tempted, then, to jump all the way into the 20th century, when Secretary Marshall set out to do something important, fundamental, about the recovery of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan—when he held out the hand of friendship to the Soviet bloc and invited the Soviet Union to take part in this post-war recovery and revival. President Truman has said that he considered General Marshall the greatest American of his day. He had unlimited confidence in him. There were men who had a deep respect for each other. General Marshall, on the other side, not only was a great military man

but a great civilian—had a deep sense of constitutional propriety; and he had no doubt in his mind about who was President, when President Truman was President. He had a sense of the realities of the situation: "Here's a piece of paper. What does this mean—out there on the spot? Here's a piece of paper. What do you want me to do about it? If I sign my name to this paper, what happens next? Who's going to do what?" This was a very good discipline for his colleagues.

I would also think of **Dean Acheson**, because I think it was he who saw most clearly that the free world had made a mistake, in 1945, in demobilizing so far and so fast, and that the weakness of the free world perhaps subjected the leaders in Moscow at that time to almost intolerable temptations.

When one thinks about it, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk—you are all such very different men. What would you say are the essential qualities of a Secretary of State?

Well, I think perhaps I'm one of the last who ought to try to comment on that question.

Sir, may I interrupt you for a moment? You were one of the first to comment on this question. Let me quote you back to you.

That was before I knew I was going to be Secretary of State!

That's right. You wrote, "The American Secretary of State has had his relations with the public further complicated, and his role in shaping of policy weakened, by the heavy and often conflicting demands which in recent years the office has exacted." And then you added these key words: "It has been difficult, in the midst of all this, for the Secretary of State to give to our allies policy that continues thought and attention which diplomatic strategy requires in a world so essentially interrelated, where every problem touches every other."

Well, this always is a central problem for a Secretary of State, and particularly in this modern era. Men like Elihu Root, at the turn of the century, could go off to his country place for 2 or 3 months at a time and leave the Department in charge of someone else. I've sometimes put it, since we think of a Secretary of State as someone on an airplane, that a Secretary of State has to think about four "motors" before he comes in con-

tact with a foreigner at all—the one, his relations with the President; his relations with the Department; his relations with the Congress; and his relations with the public. And only when those four motors are properly turning over is he then ready to take on the foreigner.

The Cuban Crisis

Mr. Secretary, at this point can we bring up the Cuban question? From Monday, October 22d, when President Kennedy revealed the menace of Soviet missiles in Cuba, to Sunday morning, October 28th, when Khrushchev said he would dismantle and withdraw, the whole world knew that we were living on the brink. But for 1 week before that, only you and a very few high officials knew what was going on. Can you tell us about that dramatic week?

I think the first information that indicated that something more than defensive weapons was present in Cuba came on late Monday night, the 15th [October], I think it was. I was giving a dinner party for the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Schroeder, that evening, and late in the evening I had a telephone call indicating that something seemed to be there very definitely that was outside our understanding of defensive weapons. So we met the next morning and laid on measures which would tell us, for certain, exactly what was there through the island.

Now, we had several meetings a day through that week, on the one side assessing the information, on the other looking at all the questions. We had to give some thought, for example, as to why it was the Soviet Union departed from its long-standing policy with respect to such weapons and tried to put them into Cuba. So far as we have known, they've never put them outside of the Soviet Union before—the medium-range missiles or the intermediate-range missiles. We had to consider what was in their minds in Moscow to lead them to take this unusual and necessarily highly provocative and challenging step. We had to consider the wide range of possibilities and our own response to it, the effect on our more than 40 allies all over the world, either in doing something or doing nothing, because whatever we do in a situation of this sort directly affects our involvement with everyone else. And so we had to spend that week being very sure that we knew what the

facts were and boxing the compass of possibilities, of reactions, of the impact of the Soviet action on the one side, our action on the other, in order to put together the entire picture, in consultation with the President, so that the President would be in the best possible position to make the final decisions that only he can make.

Well, by the Friday of that week we had—I think, Friday evening—we had pretty full information. Then when the President's decision was made, we had to work out consultations with a great many governments—our allies in the OAS, our allies in NATO, in other parts of the world, and consultations with the so-called unaligned countries. From a purely operational point of view, this was a very large undertaking. You recall that the President made his speech on Monday, October 22d.² We had a meeting of the OAS the next morning.³ We had a meeting in the Security Council of the United Nations the next day.⁴ These were a part of a very far-reaching and comprehensive political discussion with governments all over the world, looking toward a protection of our vital interests, by peaceful means if possible.

Preserving Secrecy

Mr. Rush, how hard we've seen it stay better kept than those 7 secret days. How many people in this huge State Department of maybe 50,000 employees, all told, really know about it? How'd you keep your security? How did you run this extraordinary operation?

Well, first I can't, because of our relations with Congress, let you get away with that word "secret".⁵ We have about 6,000 here in the Department of State in Washington.

There were about 12 or 15 men in government who knew the entire picture. The Vice-President, Secretary of State, Defense, and Treasury, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and a few others—Mr. McGeorge Bundy, of course, of the White House staff. But it was a very small group indeed, a small group indeed. Now, that means that we had to go on a 24-hour basis here in the Department of State,

My own colleagues, Under Secretary George Ball and Deputy Under Secretary Alex Johnson, took time about staying in the Department at night, so that we had a senior officer on duty at all times. We met in a variety of places, so that we did not create too much traffic at any one place. Senior officers did their own typing; some of my own basic papers were done in my own handwriting, in order to limit the possibility of further spread of the utterly vital matters that we were dealing with.

But by the end of the week, when the President's decision had been made, then it became necessary to extend the information to a considerable number of other people, because we had to be in a position to consult 75 or 80 governments.

Urgency of Communications

Mr. Secretary, after the President addressed the Nation, it became public knowledge, but then another problem came about and that is the channel of communications between ourselves and the adversary. Could you tell us about how one keeps communications open with the adversary in such a moment?

Well, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Union an hour before the President's television speech and gave him a copy of the speech itself, with a covering memorandum. Then during the next several days there was a variety of contacts at the United Nations. But I think the—as a matter of fact, the most crucial exchanges were the public exchanges. The President's letter of October 27 and the broadcast message from Mr. Khrushchev on October 28,⁶ in combination unlocked the crisis and made it possible to work toward a peaceful solution.

Mr. Secretary, on Sunday morning, October 28, Radio Moscow broadcast the text of Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy or you had not fully received the letter. Now, this suggests a certain urgency of communication.

I think that there was a question of speed of communications through normal channels. The sheer physical problem of transmitting messages to people who use another language, requiring decoding and translation, with differences in office

² For text, see *Bulletin* of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 720.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 725.

⁵ For texts, see *Ibid.*, p. 743.

hours in their respective capitals, did remind us all over again that immediate communication is important; and I think these public communications turned out to be the fastest communication, so that this was, I think, the importance of the broadcast message on October 28. It was a fast response to the President's message of the day before and perhaps could not have been handled through the elaborate channels of code and translation and normal diplomatic patterns.

The Impact of Cuba

Sir, perhaps you could take a tour around the world with us and tell us the impact of the Cuban affair on world affairs, beginning here at home, on the Organization of American States?

Well, I think that the sudden appearance in Cuba of these medium-range ballistic missiles and these light jet bombers gave an enormous impetus to a development which had been going on for a year or two in the hemisphere—that is, growing concern about what Cuba meant to the rest of the hemisphere. And we were really not surprised, but we were deeply gratified, to see the immediate unification of the hemisphere with unanimity on the nature of this threat and the necessity that it be removed.

I think that the unanimity in the OAS and in NATO had some bearing on what Moscow's decisions turned out to be in this situation. Had there been disunity, and had we fallen to quarreling among ourselves, I think the results might have been quite different. I think it gives us all some confidence for the future.

Now I don't want to mislead you on that, because we have cautioned our friends from drawing too many conclusions from the Cuban experience. The Soviet Union remains a great power. There were special circumstances in Cuba which are not necessarily present in other parts of the world. It would be, I think, wrong to say that, because this situation in Cuba came out the way it did, therefore a lot of other questions are going suddenly to take a new shape and new form in fundamental respects. I do think that this experience has caused an element of caution on all sides, in Moscow as well as elsewhere—that men have had to look practically at the fact that nuclear war is a real danger and not just a theoretical danger.

Clarifying Our Determination

Is it possible, sir, that the Russians might have made a miscalculation in Cuba, and if so how can we help them not make another miscalculation somewhere else?

Well, I think it's very important that they understand that, when we talk about vital interests—all of us in the free world—when we talk about these great issues of war and peace, this is serious talk. And I think they do understand that most of the time. Because it's so easy for democracies to be underestimated. We normally do a lot more than we're willing to say in advance that we'll do. And also, when you have a great sprawling democracy that is debating within itself all the time, as we are—we quarrel a good deal with each other, and we have an alliance of democracies, and there are times when it appears that, you know, we're not getting along very well together. The one thing that the outsiders must understand is that, on the great underlying issues of war and peace, we are united and firm and determined, and this is the signal we must get across; and I think there's good prospect that after this Cuban affair—that these signals can go across.

Mr. Secretary, your observations on determination, resolution, avoidance of miscalculation, certainly apply to Berlin?

Yes—for the last year and a half we have been continuing the conversations with representatives of the Soviet Union about Berlin, and that is that we consider it to be our vital interest that the commitments to the security of the people of West Berlin be sustained; and that requires the presence of the Western forces, that requires access to West Berlin, that requires a chance for the people of West Berlin to have a viable economy and to live. This is a very simple notion, and the opportunities for a great deal of compromise have pretty well been exhausted over the years; but nevertheless it is important that we continue to talk about these to see if we can't find some way to manage that problem without a great crisis.

The Tedium of Diplomacy

Sir, this continuing talking for years—that's the thing I think you once referred to as the "tedium" of diplomacy?

Yes, as a matter of fact, although some of our friends in the press look for the spectacular every day, a great deal of our work is perhaps on the boring side. In a matter like Berlin, we have been talking, but we felt it was important that we not exhibit the--perhaps the traditional American impatience to get on and get to an answer quickly. We can be just as repetitive. We can play the longplaying records just as long as someone else. We don't feel that we need to rush to an answer if the other side is unwilling to find an answer that is acceptable. This has gotten to the point where--perhaps our friends on the other side might forgive me if I say it--it's gotten to the point where, in our conversations, we've been able to refer to arguments by the numbers. He would make an argument--the ambassador or the foreign minister--and I can say, "Well, you know our position on that; this is argument No. 5. Shall I repeat it, or shall we save time and go on?" And they'll smile and say, well, we'll perhaps go on to some other subject.

Mr. Rusk, some of your colleagues say that you are the first Secretary of State we've ever had who is as repetitive, stubborn, and patient as a Russian; you can go on endlessly, and others refer to you as "the quiet American." What do they mean by that?

Well, I think, perhaps, if there is any truth in this--I am told that I made more speeches than most Secretaries of State--but I think that this may come because, to me, how the story comes out is the important thing rather than the flashy or sensational things that one might say about developments in the process. Therefore I tend to be a little reluctant to talk about crises in the midst of the crisis or negotiations in the midst of the negotiations. I think the public is, and ought to be, fully informed about what our purposes are, what our policies are, what we're trying to achieve. But I am convinced that, if the story comes out right, the public interest and the public desire for knowledge will be more than satisfied. If it doesn't come out right, flashy speeches along the way are not going to help very much.

Progress Under Free Societies

Mr. Rusk, a study has been made that goes to the borders of the newly independent countries

while interested in freedom, also want to their countries out of the muck and the mud fast as possible. And they so often say, "The Communists have done it in 45 years--that's a fast way." How do you communicate to them the fact that there are other ways to do it?

Well, I think the first thing we have to do is ask them to look at the record. And I think that we in the Western World have made a great mistake in saying to these people, "Look, it takes two or three centuries to develop; you can't do this fast," because in fact it has been done rapidly in free societies. Our own public life today is filled with people whose boyhood was spent in underdeveloped parts of our own country--men like Vice President Johnson, men like Speaker Sam Rayburn, and others. Within the lifetime of men now living, large sections of this country were underdeveloped. People now living remember the time when typhoid and malaria and pellagra and goiter and other diseases of that sort were part of the environment in which Providence had put us. Science and technology had not come to the farms or to the workshops; education was almost primitive, at least rudimentary; and in the course of 40 or 50 years there's been a great transformation in these underdeveloped parts of our own country.

It's important to recall that when I was a boy in Georgia only 1 percent of our farms in the United States had electricity and that today 97 percent of them have electricity. What happens to us has happened to hundreds of thousands of families all over the United States and again it illustrates the point that a great deal has happened in this country in the last 50 years. My father was the only one of 12 brothers and sisters who went to college. Three of his five children went to college, but all of his grandchildren will go to college. Now, that's happened to America all over the country, and it seems to me that this illustrates the dramatic transformation of life in this country in this last half-century.

Race Relations and U.S. Policy

Will Mr. Rusk, after his return from the Soviet Union, continue to put the issue of race relations before the foreign policy of the State Department? Will he continue to insist that our domestic problems

into your job of representing our country in the world?

This is why we're so deeply concerned when we in our own country fail to live up to our own highest aspirations and our own highest commitments. This, perhaps, 40 years ago would not have been very important; but today we live under the klieg lights of world attention, and—to use the baseball expression—we're expected to bat a thousand. If we stub our toes, if we fail to perform as we want to perform, then these failures are circulated around the globe, to the joy of our enemies and to the discomfort of our friends.

Now, I would have to say that these problems of discrimination here in our own country are the largest single burden we bear in the conduct of our foreign relations. It's not because there isn't discrimination and prejudice in other countries; not because there aren't differences based on race or religion, or whatever it might be, wherever you find differences of race or religion. But so much is expected of us that any failure on our part to make good on our own commitments makes an enormous difference to our leadership in the world. So I myself, as a Georgian, fully appreciative of the depth of this problem and some of the difficulties and complications of finding prompt solutions, I do think that we must move as promptly as we can to establish the fact that American citizens are American citizens in every sense of the word.

Foreign Policy and the People

This is part of your philosophy, that every citizen helps to make foreign policy?

It is always a problem of bringing home to people, and indeed to ourselves in the Department of State, that when we talk about great and distant issues in other parts of the world, or when we are talking about the abstractions of international law, or things called states, we're talking about things that enter into every home and every community in the Nation. We can't be free or prosperous if the rest of the world is subjected to tyranny or is in poverty. This intimate connection between every family and what is happening in the rest of the world is something that we need to emphasize over and over again.

And our friends abroad ought to understand

that. I've had to say to quite a few ambassadors this past year that when things like foreign aid come up, we have no mountain of gold out in some western desert out of which we can shovel funds for foreign aid. This money comes out of the taxpayer's pocket, and a great deal of it comes out of the pockets of ordinary citizens—laborers, farm-workers, taxi drivers, schoolteachers—as well as the big corporations.

Therefore, unless they do the kinds of things in their country that will give us, in good conscience, an opportunity to go to our people and say, "We think you ought to contribute to the effort that they are making," then we're on very shaky grounds here at home. No, there's a intimate involvement between the individual citizen and what we call foreign policy.

Summit Diplomacy

Mr. Rusk, you wrote another article prior to your being appointed Secretary of State, this one in the magazine Foreign Affairs, and you spoke about summits. May I quote it to you: ". . . I conclude that summit diplomacy is to be approached with the wariness with which a prudent physician prescribes a habit-forming drug. . . ." And you went on to say that this should be used very rarely and only with the most rigorous safeguards. Do you still think so?

Yes, I think I'm still of that opinion; but I think I ought to distinguish between two kinds of meetings of people who are heads of their respective states or governments. The one is the informal, friendly visit, of which there are a considerable number each year—not just ceremonial, but a chance for informal conversation to permit President Kennedy and great leaders from other countries to get personally acquainted. But where there is, in effect, adversary negotiation, and where the consequences of failure are very great, it seems to me that these must be handled with great care, because when the summit is in session the court of last resort is in session. It's hard to see where you go from there, if there's a failure. And many of these problems which are in contest, say, between ourselves and the free world and the Soviet bloc, are so utterly complicated and so utterly dangerous that I felt that we ought to try to exhaust the processes of patient and quiet diplomacy as much as possible, to prepare the way for agree-

ment, because the consequences of a final disagreement are so very great.

Well, sir, summitry suggests travel, and travel suggests John Foster Dulles, and I believe that you were one of many who used to criticize Mr. Dulles for his frequent travels.

I think in the first year of my tenure I outflew Mr. Dulles to a brief extent, as far as his first year was concerned. This is, itself, getting to be a very serious problem. I've been talking with other foreign ministers about a trade union of foreign ministers, to create more tolerable working conditions among themselves! It has been suggested at times that we pick up Thomas Jefferson's original title, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and have a roving Secretary of State, while the principal Secretary of State stays here and takes care of the Department and the situation in Washington and keeps in close touch with the President.

Disarmament and Nuclear Testing

Referring to the aftermath of the Cuban situation, can you discuss its impact on Mr. Khrushchev and the Russians themselves? There seem to be some signs that perhaps they're reaching out.

If I may speak purely personally, it seems to me that we lived through a period of weeks which underlined the importance of trying to make some progress on disarmament, if we can, because, in a very real sense, this latest aspect of the Cuban crisis has been a crisis of the arms race. Here we had these powerful weapons in Cuba, in an unaccustomed place, brought across an ocean, directly threatening our own hemisphere and this country. Now, as we look ahead and we see the possibility of the spiraling arms race moving upward and upward, with greater and greater sophistication, greater instability, greater dangers, we should try to find ways, if possible, to turn that arms race downward. Now, we're not going to be able to achieve that overnight by some sudden, massive elimination of weapons; but surely we ought to be able to find some specific and tangible and practical steps in the field—at least begin to stop the spiraling nuclear testing perhaps, some of the measures against surprise attack. There are other points where we might take hold, find some handles, at I begin to say to ourselves, on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain, that this situation

threatens to pass beyond the capacity of man to handle it.

Mr. Secretary, the Russians say that both sides have a tamperproof seismic box that can distinguish nuclear explosions, and that onsite inspection isn't necessary. This is very much the discussion going on on a nuclear test ban. What is your answer to that?

We do not have, at the present time, the kind of instruments which can clearly distinguish between an underground nuclear explosion and certain kinds of earthquakes. We have instruments that will help simplify an inspection system, but we don't have the instruments that will do the crucial job of telling whether this underground event was a nuclear test or an earthquake. Now, we can't say categorically that the Russians don't have such instruments, but what we have said to the Russians, more than 20 times, is that if you have them, bring them forward. We'll take a look at them. Let's let our scientists sit down and have a look at these instruments, because from that point of view there is no policy argument. What we want is assurance that, when we sign a nuclear test ban, no one tests. Because we can't live, quite frankly, with the waves of suspicion rolling over the free world in connection with disarmament, if we're living in ignorance of what is happening in this vast area, the Eurasian landmass.

Red China and the U.S.S.R.

Sir, you've referred to the great Eurasian landmass. Now, that includes China. From a practical point of view, how can you sign a nuclear test ban treaty with Russia if China is not a party to it?

Well, in the first instance, Mr. Schoenbrun, we have a very simple answer for that. The agreement itself which we've tabled in Geneva, would be canceled immediately if any other nation conducted a nuclear test. In other words, we obviously could not sign a nuclear test ban treaty if any nation around the world were free to continue testing; so that that is built in to the treaty—that particular safeguard. Now, I would have to say that the prospects at the moment that the authorities in Peking would sign a nuclear test ban treaty are not very good.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for taking time to discuss the

quarrels inside our outspoken free society, but in recent weeks it looks as though the monolithic Communist bloc isn't all that monolithic. Can you comment on that?

The principal arguments within the bloc have to do with how best to get on with their revolution. In Peiping, for example, they appear to want to take a more aggressive, more military, approach to these questions—to go back to some of the—shall I say the more primitive aspects of Leninism. In Moscow they're more subtle and sophisticated. They talk about **peaceful coexistence**. They are using such instruments as economic assistance and things of that sort. This is chiefly an argument of technique. I don't think that we ought to jump too quickly to the conclusion that these differences mean that we have any room for complacency or relaxation of effort, because they both are committed to their kind of world system.

But you do judge, sir, that these are serious differences between Moscow and Peiping?

They are very serious and very far-reaching. They have to do with the leadership of the bloc itself, with basic questions of philosophy. I think the confusion that has been thrown into Communist parties all over the world, not just in the Communist countries themselves, by this doctrinal debate between Moscow and Peiping has been helpful to the free world. But I just want to be certain that I don't leave the impression that there's much comfort in these differences for us yet. Let's see how the story comes out.

Red China and India

How would you read China's adventur in India?

Well, it's—I perhaps could say more about that, say, in mid-December than I can at the present time, because in accordance with the announcement made by Peiping about their so-called "cease-fire" December 1 is a fairly important date.

As you know, China has had for many years, before the Communists came to power, certain territorial claims along that southern frontier. But the thing that has most concerned us is that the authorities in Peiping should have used violence in an attempt to settle a question which ought to be settled, if possible, by a course of ne-

gotiation; and the scale of their violence holds open the prospect that their intentions go far beyond the border issues.

Now, I think the events in India have alerted many Afro-Asian countries to the threat which has come from Peiping. They understand that these are not issues that just turn upon some sort of cold war between Moscow and Washington, that there are other elements here that threaten their independence. And the rallying around of world opinion behind India in this situation, I think, must be a signal to the other side that India not only is a country with great potential of its own, great industrial strength, and is not to be easily tampered with, despite these immediate and short-term military reverses, but also that India, in the event of aggression, serious aggression, would have the support of the rest of the world. And this is something that Peiping must think seriously about.

"The Great Human Tradition"

Mr. Secretary, India has always been the very symbol of a neutral nation. Now it seems to be seeking aid in some kind of alignment. Can you clarify this for us?

I'm reminded of the remark that President Kennedy made to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September of 1961.⁶ He said that in that hall there were really only two sides, not three. There were those who were trying to build the kind of world laid out in the United Nations Charter, and there were those who were trying to prevent that kind of world from coming into being. And on that underlying issue, there are only two sides.

Now let me say that, as far as allies are concerned, we do have a very special relationship with allies. We have committed the safety and the lives and the material capacities of the American people to our allies in their and our mutual defense. Now, what is our principal interest in the neutrals? It's their independence, so that in the most fundamental sense our interest, both in allies and in neutrals, is the same—a world community of independent nations, cooperating voluntarily across national frontiers in the common interest. Now, that means that, whereas we have

⁶ *IBR*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

very specific commitments to allies, we also have some very deep interest in what happens to the neutrals, and I think both our allies and I think most neutrals understand this.

If I could be just a little presumptuous as an American, Mr. Schenbrun, I really think that it would be difficult to find any people, anywhere in the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, that believe that the American people, or the United States, is trying to take something away from them that belongs to them. I really think that one of the greatest strengths we have, in this present period, is that we carry our purposes on our sleeves; and the purposes we carry are for peace within the framework of the United Nations kind of world community. And on these issues I think allies and neutrals are together.

I don't really think this is a new doctrine. I think it's almost as old as our Republic, because the simple political principles on which this Republic was founded are a part of a great human discourse that has been going on for more than 2,000 years. Now, we are not the pinnacle—we are not the final result, the full flower of that tradition; we're only a part of it. But these simple notions, after 2,000 years, seem to me to be clearly rooted deeply in the nature of man himself; and if that is so, that means that these are shared by men and women all over the world. The democracy that we talk about has been reflected in the village democracy of India, pre-Christian period, and in the traditions of people in almost every continent and every cultural tradition. This is why I think that we have almost instinctive allies wherever we turn, in trying to build the kind of world that fits our own tradition, because our tradition is a part of the great human tradition.

I must say that when we talk to people from other nations and other racial, cultural groups, other religions, in different parts of the world, we don't really have to spend much time arguing with them about what we're after. We're after the most elementary human opportunities for a decent life, and they understand that. Our discussion is, how do you get there, under their circumstances and ours, and what can we do together to move it. We don't debate about purposes. These purposes are in the nature of man. We've articulated them in one way, they've articulated them in others;

but it is really striking to me, and is something that I experience almost every week, to see how strong is this family of man, if I might put it that way, and how much confidence and assurance we can get, that we're not talking strange language to other people.

Sir, can you communicate to these noncommitted nations your own fervor and faith in America's democracy and growth, so that they understand that the way to progress is our way and not the Communist way?

If I put it in terms of "our way" as meaning simply the American way, I would fail. But if I put it, to use your expression, "our way" as a joint way, there's not really too much difficulty. Again, we do not have a monopoly on these central ideas that we talk about here in our American society. We didn't invent the presumption of innocence. We didn't invent jury trials. We didn't invent constitutional processes. But we have made an enormous contribution to the institutional structure of freedom, and we have, I think, sharpened and refined the ways in which people can be free, under rules of law which make it possible for each one of us, as individuals, to pursue our rather eccentric orbits without collision with each other. And this is something that people in other countries want, appreciate, but also they claim it as their own; and I wouldn't want to try to take it away from them by saying, "Look, this notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is a sort of American invention." This is a human invention, and they understand it and are reaching for it, and this is a joint effort.

Changing Patterns in World Affairs

Sir, when I leave this Adenauer was here to work up the President in a speech he made spoke of a great turning point in East-West relations and a historic change in the world. You picked up, I think, the same theme in New York, when you said of great impounding decisions? Are we at a moment of change in world history?

Well, that's a little difficult to answer, Mr. Schenbrun, 'cause it's hard for me to predict

¹ *Post, Dec. 1, 1962, p. 867.*

what I called in New York unpredictable events. But I do think that some of the patterns of the world that we've been living through, for the last decade or so, are changing, and I think that it is possible that men's approach to them will change. I think in these recent weeks, if I may perhaps state it rather strangely, I think men in more than one country have had a chance to confront the first question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism—What is the chief end of man?—and I think that has been a sobering experience for everyone concerned. And I think some of the illusory commitments, some of the fanciful ideas, give way to an underlying sense of reality, and that out of this may come a determination on the part of many leaders to build the kind of world which is tolerable and not the kind of world which—whose problems almost literally pass beyond the capacity of the mind of man to handle. And so I think that there will be a new note of sobriety on all sides. At least, that is the hope. Because I think this has been a very instructive experience through which everyone has gone.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

President Hopes for Progress in Disarmament Talks

Statement by President Kennedy'

The 18-nation disarmament conference resumes its deliberations in Geneva today. This is as it should be. The crucial developments within recent weeks have served to confirm both the need and urgency of the task before it.

It is clear that a renewed and immediate effort must be made to halt the constantly increasing tempo of the arms race if there is to be assurance of a lessening of the danger of war. It is, therefore, my continued hope that serious negotiations will proceed at once on those initial measures of

disarmament which could, if put into effect without delay, materially improve international security and enhance the prospects for further disarmament progress.

Among these measures we believe high priority should be given to the conclusion of an effective agreement which would end once and for all tests of nuclear weapons.¹ The United States has completed its recent series of atmospheric tests. There is hope that the Soviet Union evidently will soon conclude its series of atmospheric tests. This suggests that a moment may be at hand to initiate the beginning of the end of the upward spiral of weapons competition. If so, the opportunity must not be lost.

It is important that these negotiations now move forward and that concrete progress be achieved. To this end, I pledge anew my personal and continuing interest in the work of the conference.

U.S. and Belgium Warn of Stronger Measures To Restore Congo Unity

Following is the text of a joint statement issued at Washington by President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium on November 27 after an exchange of views on the Congo.

The United States Government and the Government of Belgium reaffirm their full support for the U Thant plan² for the reunification of the Congo. The United States Government and the Government of Belgium have up to this point directed their efforts toward accomplishment of the plan along the lines of voluntary discussion and actions of the parties concerned. This approach has not, however, produced the necessary results. If there is not substantial progress within a very short period of time, the United States Government and the Government of Belgium fully realize that it will be necessary to execute further phases under the United Nations plan which include severe economic measures.

¹ Read by U.S. Representative Arthur H. Dean before the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, on Nov. 26 (White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated Nov. 25, for release Nov. 26).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1962, p. 817.
³ For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.13 and Corr. 1.